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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Debt bias reflects a tax distortion for companies to use debt rather than equity to finance 
investment. It is caused by interest payments being deductible for the corporate income tax 
(CIT), while equity payments are not. By now, there is ample empirical evidence showing that 
the CIT indeed affects the capital structure of non-financial companies (Feld et al., 2013; De 
Mooij, 2011). On average, studies report that the marginal tax effect on the debt-asset ratio 
ranges between 0.2 and 0.3. Hence, a 10 percentage points higher CIT rate raises the debt-to-
asset ratio of companies by somewhere between 2 and 3 percentage points.  
 
However, the existing literature on debt bias has ignored the financial sector. This is surprising 
as debt bias can potentially be a far greater concern here than elsewhere in the economy due to 
externalities associated with systemic risk. Indeed, financial institutions may choose 
inefficiently high levels of debt, as they take no account of the external costs of their own 
failure on others. By increasing the probability of failure and, subsequently, increasing the risk 
of contagion through the financial system, high debt ratios in financial institutions can 
jeopardize the stability of the financial system as a whole. There is evidence that aggregate 
leverage of the financial sector positively affects the probability of financial crisis (Barrell et al. 
(2010); Kato, Kobayashi, and Saita (2010); De Mooij, Keen and Orihara (2013)). When tax bias 
exacerbates existing distortions in the financial system, its welfare loss can be much larger than 
is the case for debt bias in non-financial firms. 
 
A key question is, therefore, whether banks empirically show the same response to taxes as 
what has been found for non-financial companies. Only recently, studies have started to explore 
debt bias in the financial sector empirically. Keen and de Mooij (2012) use a large cross-country 
panel of banks and find that the CIT significantly raises bank leverage ratios. On average, this 
effect is about as large as that found for non-banks. However, Keen and De Mooij (2012) also 
find important differences across different banks. For instance, the effects are much smaller for 
the largest banks, which generally account for the vast bulk of bank assets, and for banks 
featuring higher leverage ratios. Hemmelgarn and Teichmann (2013) find similar results, using 
a different specification and similar data as in Keen and De Mooij (2013). That the elasticity 
gets smaller with the size of banks is also found by De Mooij, Keen and Orihara (2013), who 
partition the sample used in De Mooij and Keen (2012) into a larger number of size groups. 
Finally, Gu, De Mooij and Poghosyan (2012) exploit a panel of subsidiaries of the 100 largest 
multinational banks. They report significant tax effects on leverage, including through 
multinational debt shifting across jurisdictions, again with effects that are of broadly similar size 
as those found for non-banks.   
 
The underlying paper contributes to the empirical literature on debt bias in three important 
ways. First, we exploit the Worldscope database containing financial data for both banks and 
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non-banks. This allows us to formally test if there is a significant difference in the tax 
responsiveness between banks and non-banks.  
 
Second, we explore in detail how firm size affects responsiveness to tax. For banks, Keen and 
De Mooij (2012) and De Mooij, Keen and Orihara (2013) explore the role of size, but by 
partitioning the sample into discrete size categories. For non-banks, Gordon and Lee (2001) is 
the only study that analyzes the importance of size for the tax responsiveness of firms. They use 
time series data from US tax returns. These data are not reflecting individual firms, but rather 
aggregate variables for a number of asset size categories. The authors include in their capital-
structure regressions an interaction term of the tax variable with a polynomial of this assets size 
by category. Their results suggest a U-shaped pattern of the elasticity with asset size, suggesting 
that both very small and very large firms are relatively responsive to tax. This paper follows the 
approach of Gordon and Lee (2001), but uses micro data on asset size to measure its importance 
for the tax responsiveness, both of banks and non-banks. 
 
Third, this paper uses quantile regressions to explore whether tax effects differ along the 
conditional leverage distribution, i.e. conditional on other characteristics of a firm that can 
affect its debt ratio. For instance, a high initial leverage ratio may reduce the flexibility of a firm 
to adjust it further due to high marginal costs. For a bank, moreover, a high leverage ratio means 
that it has a smaller buffer vis-à-vis the capital requirement and, therefore, possibly less room 
for maneuver in adjusting debt. However, high leverage may also signal easy access to credit 
and, therefore, may be associated with a high responsiveness to tax. The quantile regressions 
shed light on these issues for both banks and non-banks. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses our methodology and data. 
Section III presents the regression results, including the quantile regressions. Section IV 
concludes. 
II.   METHODOLOGY 
A.   Specification and estimation 
Theoretical underpinnings of capital structure regressions usually originate in agency models 
or trade-off theories with bankruptcy costs. In those models, firms trade off some non-tax 
costs of debt finance, with the tax-benefit from debt associated with interest deductibility. 
The capital structure of banks might be governed by other factors than that of non-financial 
companies. For example, one might think that taxes matter less for banks than for non-banks 
because capital requirements restrict banks from having too high debt. However, banks may 
face similar tax incentives for debt finance as long as it is privately optimal for them to hold 
some buffer over regulatory requirements—and data suggest that most banks indeed hold 
such buffers (Keen and De Mooij, 2012). Moreover, bank capital structure regressions 
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suggest that bank choices of debt are actually very similar to those of non-financial firms 
(Gropp and Heider, 2010). The difference in the response to tax by banks and non-banks is 
therefore ambiguous and ultimately an empirical issue. 
 
This paper uses a reduced-form specification that is commonly used in the empirical 
literature on capital structures, including for banks (Frank and Goyal, 2009; Gropp and 
Heider, 2010). The strategy is thus to estimate baseline regressions of the form: 
 
(1) ݈݁ݒ௜௦௖௧ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ߬௖௧ ൅ ߚଷ࢞௜௖௧ ൅ ߜ௦ ൅ ߠ௖ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ߳௜௧ 
 
where the subscript i denotes each firm, s is a subscript for each industry, c denotes each 
country, and t is a subscript for each year. The dependent variable, lev, is the leverage-to-
assets ratio, ߬ is the country-specific statutory CIT rate which the firms face, and ࢞௜௖௧ is a 
vector of additional controls usually included in capital structure regressions. We also 
include full sets of time fixed effects ߤ௧, industry fixed effects ߜ௦ (for the regression of non-
banks) and country-fixed effects ߠ௖. Regarding the additional control variables, (1) includes 
first the book value of a firm’s total assets (in logs) and, in some of the regressions, also its 
square to allow for size effects. Most studies find that firm size exerts a positive effect on 
leverage. Second, operating income over total assets is captured in (1) as a measure of 
profitability. Higher profits add to equity when retained within the firm and thus directly 
reduce the leverage ratio. Yet, profits may also signal good health of a firm and give them 
easier access to credit, thus raising the debt ratio. A priori, the effect is thus ambiguous. 
Third, we include a measure of collateral, namely the share of tangible assets in total assets. 
For non-banks, capital structure regressions typically find that collateral increases access to 
external funding and thus lead to higher leverage ratios. The nature of the banking sector and 
the impact of regulation may produce a different relationship for banks, however. Finally, we 
control for the growth rate of GDP and the rate of inflation to allow for country-specific 
variation in macro variables over time. High growth at the country level has no clear 
theoretical implications for debt ratios and might also control for factors correlated with high 
growth, such as credit growth. Inflation may lead to higher risk premiums (as it may reveal 
uncertainty about future price developments and thus unexpected inflation) and discourage 
debt supply. Yet, as nominal interest is deductible for the CIT, high inflation may also 
encourage debt finance as it lowers real borrowing costs. The net impact of inflation on 
leverage is therefore ambiguous. 
 
We estimate our baseline specification (1) and all its modifications by OLS. Thereby, we 
consider three different samples of data: the sample of non-banks, the sample of banks, and a 
combined sample of all companies. In the latter, we use bank dummies to distinguish the 
effects between banks and non-banks. Standard errors are always robust to clustering at the 
firm level. 
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We pay special attention to the variation of marginal tax responses according to firm size. 
Following Gordon and Lee (2001), we add to (1) an interaction of the tax variable with a first 
or second-order polynomial of log assets. Size may have important implications for corporate 
governance and risk exposure and, therefore, for tax responsiveness. For example, small 
firms are more likely to be credit constrained because they suffer more from asymmetric 
information vis-à-vis lenders. This will not only reduce their leverage, but can also make 
them less flexible in adjusting leverage ratios at the margin. However, small firms also 
usually seek credit from insiders in the firm who can be particularly flexible and also more 
sensitive to tax. Large firms, on the other hand, can issue debt securities, i.e. commercial 
papers or corporate bonds, on the capital market. This leads to higher debt ratios and could 
also make them more responsive to tax at the margin. For large banks, moreover, their too-
big-to-fail status may render corporate governance relations very different, leading them to 
choose higher debt ratios. This, by itself, can affect tax responsiveness at the margin of 
finance. Hence, the impact of firm size on the tax sensitivity of corporate debt is not a priori 
clear, neither for non-financial companies nor for banks.  
 
Another issue we address is the role of the leverage distribution. If the non-tax cost of debt 
finance is convex, then profit-maximizing firms will set the linear tax advantage of debt 
equal to its marginal non-tax cost. The latter will depend on the convexity of the cost 
function, which may differ between firms. At the margin, the tax response may thus be 
smaller for companies that already feature high debt ratios, because the cost of debt rises 
more rapidly. The variation in marginal tax effects along the conditional leverage distribution 
will be examined by the use of quantile regressions (Koencker and Bassett, 1978; Koencker 
and Hallock, 2001). These approximate the conditional median or other quantiles, instead of 
the conditional mean of the dependent variable. On the one hand, this gives more robust 
estimates, especially if the response measurements are highly skewed (as is the case for 
banks in our sample). On the other hand, the quantile regression can be used to explore 
whether tax effects vary along the conditional distribution of leverage, i.e. conditional on all 
other features of a firm that determine its leverage. Especially financial institutions 
displaying very high and potentially inefficient leverage ratios can jeopardize the stability of 
the financial system. It is thus important to learn how tax incentives affect these highly 
levered banks, rather than only focusing on conditional mean responses. But also for non-
banks, excessive levels of debt can add to the destabilization of the economy during times of 
downturn. 
B.   Data 
Firm-level data are taken from Worldscope, compiled by Thomson Financial. The database 
contains financial information on public companies from a wide range of industries, 
countries and years. We use the years between 1996 and 2010. After excluding observations 
with missing values for required variables, the sample consists of 38,867 firms from 69 
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countries and totals 336,051 firm-year observations. There are 1,603 banks in the sample 
contributing 17,227 bank-year observations. Thus, the banks’ share in the total number of 
firms is 4.1 percent and their share in the overall sample of observations is 5.1 percent. 
Appendix I gives more information about the sample by country. 
 
The data reflect the consolidated accounts of firms. This may be problematic to the extent 
that the balance sheet and accounts of foreign branches or wholly-owned subsidiaries are 
included in the data, as the tax rate applying to the parent might not properly reflect the 
actual tax on the variables in the accounts. However, most countries tax branches on a 
worldwide basis (and US also taxes subsidiaries on a worldwide basis), so that ultimately the 
tax rate of the parent matters for the foreign source profit. Moreover, it is the consolidated 
statements that matter ultimately for the financial stability of a firm. This motivates the use of 
consolidated statements over unconsolidated ones. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Sample Mean SD Median Min Max  
 All firms 0.4863 0.2541 0.4924 0 1 
Leverage Ratio Banks 0.9006 0.0751 0.9130 0 0.9993 
 Non-banks 0.4639 0.2408 0.4739 0 1 
 All firms 0.3325 0.0830 0.3399 0 0.5725 
Corporate income tax rate Banks 0.3665 0.0723 0.4076 0 0.5725 
 Non-banks 0.3307 0.0831 0.335 0 0.5725 
 All firms 18.7271 2.3667 18.6637 6.9078 29.1844 
Log total assets Banks 21.4586 2.2345 21.0481 11.8914 29.1844 
 Non-banks 18.5795 2.2823 18.5457 6.9078 28.363 
Operating income over 
assets 
All firms 0.00643 0.2283 0.0381 -2.5556 0.7459 
Banks 0.0095 0.0331 0.0110 -1.8278 0.5457 
Non-banks 0.0062 0.2342 0.0425 -2.5556 0.7459 
 All firms 0.2920 0.2528 0.2399 0 1 
Collateral Banks 0.0189 0.0193 0.0158 0 0.9866 
 Non-banks 0.3067 0.2512 0.2595 0 1 
 All firms 0.0599 0.0613 0.0546 -0.1143 0.4298 
GPD growth rate Banks 0.0564 0.0544 0.0540 -0.1143 0.4298 
 Non-banks 0.0601 0.0616 0.0546 -0.1143 0.4298 
 All firms 0.0250 0.0307 0.0219 -0.0623 0.2586 
Inflation rate Banks 0.0278 0.0278 0.0244 -0.0623 0.2586 
 Non-banks 0.0249 0.0309 0.0212 -0.0623 0.2586 
Note: Number of observations is 336,051 for the full sample including all firms, 17,227 for the sample with 
banks and 318,824 for the sample with non-banks. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of all variables used in the analysis for the full sample, 
the subsample of banks, and the subsample of non-banks. There are large differences 
between banks and non-banks with regard to the average leverage ratio, defined as the ratio 
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of total liabilities to total assets of the firm. The mean leverage ratio of banks is 90 percent, 
while that of non-banks is less than 50 percent. Collateral, measured as the share of tangible 
assets in terms of total assets, is 1.9 percent for banks whereas it is over 30 percent for non-
banks. A third important difference between banks and non-banks is the size distribution. 
Figures 1 and 2 show histograms, and the cumulative distributions of the logarithm of total 
assets of non-banks and banks, respectively.  
Figure 1: Size distribution of non-banks (log of total assets) 
  
Figure 1 shows that the log of the size distribution of non-banks is close to standard normal. 
Values are symmetrically dispersed around the mean log of assets of 18.58 (US$ 117 
million). Some 25 percent have a log of total assets below 17.16 (US$ 28 million) whereas 
the 75 percent quantile is at 20 (US$ 482 million). The 1 percent and 5 percent quantiles are, 
respectively, at 12.66 and 14.84 (US$ 316 thousand and US$ 2.8 million). The 95 percent 
and 99 percent quantiles are, respectively, at 22.47, and 24.29 (US$ 5.8 billion; and US$ 35.4 
billion).  
 
Banks are generally larger than non-banks. The mean log of assets of banks is 21.45 (US$ 
2.1 billion). Moreover, Figure 2 shows a skewed size distribution for banks, with few small 
banks. The 1 percent and 5 percent quantiles are at, respectively, 17.5 and 18.47 (US$ 40 
million; US$ 105 million). The right tail is rather long with numerous large and very large 
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banks in the sample. The 90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent quantiles are, respectively, 
24.5, 25.48, and 27.37 (US$ 44 billion, US$ 116 billion, and US$ 771 billion).  
Figure 2: Size distribution of banks (log of total assets) 
  
III.   RESULTS 
We now regress (1) on three samples: (i) non-banks; (ii) banks; and (iii) the overall sample. 
Subsequently, we present results from quantile regressions. 
A.   Non-banks 
Regression results for the sample of non-banks are displayed in Table 2. Column (1) shows 
the estimated tax coefficient from a simple regression of the leverage ratio on statutory CIT 
rates, thereby excluding fixed effects. Column (2) augments this specification by time, 
country and industry fixed effects. Column (3) adds firm size (measured by the log of total 
assets) as explanatory variable. Column (4) adds operating income over total assets, and 
collateral, measured in terms of tangibility. Moreover, it includes an interaction of log assets 
with the CIT rate. Column (5) then adds the macroeconomic variables: GDP growth and 
inflation. Column (6) adds a quadratic polynomial of firm size to allow for nonlinear size 
effects, and also includes an interaction of that with the CIT rate.  
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All tax coefficients reported in columns (1) – (3) are statistically significant at the one 
percent level. The estimated marginal tax effect on the leverage ratio is between 0.34 in 
column (1) and 0.2 in column (3). The latter means that the leverage ratio rises by 2 
percentage points if the CIT rate increases by 10 percentage points.  
Table 2: Capital structure regressions for non-banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CIT rate 0.3411*** 0.2172*** 0.1974*** -0.0428 -0.0354 2.9103*** 
 (26.6995) (9.3032) (8.7968) (-0.4142) (-0.3429) (5.7188) 
Log assets   0.0269*** 0.0258*** 0.0259*** 0.1036*** 
   (58.2108) (13.7773) (13.7931) (5.1685) 
Log assets sq.      -0.0021*** 
      (-3.8456) 
Log assets * CIT    0.0122** 0.0121** -0.3050*** 
    (2.3015) (2.2837) (-5.5942) 
Log assets sq * CIT      0.0084*** 
      (5.7757) 
Profitability    -0.1110*** -0.1111*** -0.1010*** 
    (-34.0219) (-34.0476) (-30.5079) 
Collateral    0.0629*** 0.0628*** 0.0643*** 
    (14.3610) (14.3548) (14.6414) 
GDP growth     0.0324** 0.0307** 
     (2.5546) (2.4233) 
Inflation     -0.0813*** -0.0828*** 
     (-3.7410) (-3.8085) 
Constant 0.3511*** 0.4135*** -0.0811*** -0.0766** -0.0797** -0.8052*** 
 (84.1645) (37.3479) (-5.9958) (-2.0668) (-2.1491) (-4.2965) 
Tax effects 
(at sample mean size) 
0.3411*** 0.2172*** 0.1974*** 0.1845*** 0.1901*** 0.1469*** 
(26.6995) (9.3032) (8.7968) (8.25) (8.43) (6.21) 
Time dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 318,824 318,824 318,824 318,824 318,824 318,824 
Adj. R-squared 0.0139 0.171 0.222 0.234 0.234 0.236 
 
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 2 examine whether the responsiveness of corporate debt to tax 
varies with firm size. We see that the direct tax coefficient is negative, but the interaction of 
the CIT rate with log assets positive and significant at 5 percent. Hence, the debt ratio in 
larger firms tends to be more responsive to the CIT rate than in smaller firms. The estimated 
marginal tax effect evaluated at the sample mean of the log of total assets is 0.18 and 0.19 in 
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the two columns (t-values of 8.25 and 8.43, respectively), i.e. close to the marginal 
coefficient in column (3). 
 
Column (6) shows results with an interaction of the tax rate and a quadratic polynomial of 
log assets. All tax terms are significant at 1 percent confidence. Using point estimates from 
column (6) and evaluating the outcome at the sample mean of log assets, the marginal tax 
effect is 0.15 and statistically significant (t-value: 6.21).  
 
Using regression (6) of Table 2, Figure 3 shows how the point estimate of the marginal tax 
effect varies along the size distribution of firms. It also shows the 95% confidence interval. 
The positive coefficient for the quadratic interaction of size and the CIT rate implies a 
convex shape of this curve. Hence, both very small and very large firms feature relatively 
large tax responses, while intermediate firms features relatively small tax responses. Over the 
most relevant range of the size distribution, however, the tax response is always smaller than 
0.5. Indeed, 99 percent of the firms feature a tax coefficient below 0.5. Only for firms with 
log assets below 11.62 (asset value of US$ 111 thousand) and those with log assets 
exceeding 24.68 (asset value of US$ 52.3 billion) we find a marginal tax response larger than 
0.5. In terms of asset value, however, the very large firms with log assets exceeding 24.68 are 
important as they own approximately 45.8 percent of the total assets in our sample of non-
banks. 
 
Figure 3: Marginal tax effect on the leverage ratio along the size distribution of non-banks
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The increasing responsiveness of the very large firms may be due to their easy access to 
credit. The result is similar to that found by Gordon and Lee (2001), who use time series data 
for the US. They, however, attribute their finding to possible erroneous measurement of the 
tax incentive for intermediate-sized firms, rather than to differential access to credit. In 
particular, the US applied differential CIT rates to firms and the measurement of the 
appropriate rate of CIT applying to intermediate sized firms might have been misspecified. In 
our sample, however, the large majority of firms is subject to a proportional CIT regime so 
that measurement error with respect to a firm’s tax incentives, on average, is unlikely to vary 
with firm size. Consequently, it seems unlikely that the pattern observed in Figure 3 is caused 
by measurement error. 
 
Looking at non-tax factors, firm size itself in columns (3) – (6) exerts a significant positive 
effect on leverage. Profitability in columns (4) – (6) always exerts a significant negative 
effect on leverage, reflecting the rise in equity as a result of higher retained earnings. 
Collateral in columns (4) – (6) appears with an expected positive coefficient, significant at 1 
percent. In columns (5) and (6), GDP growth is associated with an increase in corporate debt, 
while the effect of inflation is negative. 
B.   Banks 
Regression results for banks are displayed in Table 3. The sequence of specifications is the 
same as for non-banks in Table 2. The tax coefficients reported in columns (1) – (3) are 
statistically significant at the one percent level. The magnitude of the tax response is between 
0.06 and 0.14, i.e. slightly lower than for non-banks in Table 2. The coefficient in column (3) 
means, for example, that the leverage ratio of banks rises by approximately 1.3 percentage 
points if the marginal tax rate increases by 10 percentage points.  
Columns (4) and (5) add an interaction of tax and bank size. The significant negative 
coefficient of the interaction term (at 5 percent confidence) suggests that the marginal tax 
effect on banks’ leverage ratio is a decreasing function of bank size. This is opposite from 
non-banks, where we find a positive relationship. It is, however, consistent with the results in 
Keen and De Mooij (2012). Evaluated at the sample mean of bank size, the estimated 
marginal tax effect on the leverage ratio is 0.20 in column (4) (t-value: 4.53) and 0.21 in 
column (5) (t-value: 4.66). This is larger than in columns (1) – (3) and very similar to the 
marginal impact that we find for an average non-bank.  
Column (6) of Table 3 shows the outcomes of a second-order polynomial of size, interacted 
with the tax rate. None of the individual tax coefficients are significant, including that for the 
interaction with the log of size squared. The combined tax effect of the three tax terms 
together, however, is significant over an important range. However, over the relevant range 
of the size distribution, the very small coefficient for the quadratic interaction terms suggests 
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that the relationship between bank size and the tax effect is close to linear. For this reason, 
we prefer the linear interaction according to regression (5) to illustrate the relationship of 
bank size and tax responsiveness. 
Table 3: Capital structure regressions for banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CIT rate 0.0555*** 0.1377*** 0.1323*** 0.8437** 0.8598** 1.6657 
 (3.1480) (3.5873) (3.9370) (2.5052) (2.5406) (0.7299) 
Log assets   0.0157*** 0.0254*** 0.0255*** 0.1840** 
   (9.8095) (4.4332) (4.4447) (2.4194) 
Log assets sq.      -0.0032** 
      (-1.9883) 
Log assets * CIT    -0.0298** -0.0302** -0.0562 
    (-2.0932) (-2.1144) (-0.2879) 
Log assets sq * CIT      -0.0005 
      (-0.1212) 
Operating income    0.0485 0.0484 -0.0794 
    (0.4232) (0.4215) (-0.7622) 
Collateral    -0.3956*** -0.3945*** -0.2533* 
    (-2.6888) (-2.6817) (-1.7958) 
GDP growth     -0.0004 0.0253 
     (-0.0152) (0.9981) 
Inflation     -0.0590 -0.0733* 
     (-1.3865) (-1.8346) 
Constant 0.8803*** 0.8358*** 0.5247*** 0.2918** 0.2873** -1.6300* 
 (128.5356) (51.6186) (13.1783) (2.1548) (2.1146) (-1.8208) 
Tax effects 
(at sample mean size) 
0.0555*** 0.1377*** 0.1323*** 0.2033*** 0.2108*** 0.2277*** 
(3.1480) (3.5873) (3.9370) (4.53) (4.66) (5.75) 
Time dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 17,227 17,227 17,227 17,227 17,227 17,227 
Adj. R-squared 0.00280 0.120 0.226 0.238 0.238 0.300 
 
Figure 4 shows how the marginal tax effect varies with bank size according to regression (5). 
The negative coefficient for the interaction term implies a downward slope, i.e. the tax effect 
is largest for small banks, with a marginal impact close to 0.5. The effect gradually falls and 
becomes insignificant for banks with log assets of 25 (total assets of US$ 72 billion). This 
applies to the 7.1 percent largest banks. For them, Figure 4 shows that the point estimate 
becomes negative, but due to very large standard errors, the effect is insignificant. For the 
median bank (log assets 21.0), the marginal coefficient is 0.22 (t-value of 4.53). 
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Figure 4: Marginal tax effect on the leverage ratio along the size distribution of banks 
(based on interaction with 1st order polynomial of size) 
 
According to regressions (3) – (6) in Table 3, non-tax factors affect the leverage ratio of 
banks differently than for non-banks. Size itself enters with a positive coefficient, as is the 
case for non-banks. Profitability, however, does not exert a significant effect on bank 
leverage. This contrasts with non-banks where profitability enters with a significant negative 
sign. Collateral has a different interpretation for banks than it has for non-banks, and its 
negative coefficient does not necessarily reflect the usual role collateral has for debt ratios for 
non-banks (where it enters positively). GDP growth and inflation arise with insignificant 
coefficients.  
C.   Banks and Non-Banks 
Regressions on the sample of all firms, including banks and non-banks, are presented in 
Table 4. It only displays results for the tax variables and their interactions with size, not for 
the control variables (which are all included in the regression, but not shown).  
 
Column (1) only includes the CIT rate variable and no interactions with size, nor does it 
include bank dummies. Since non-bank observations dominate the sample, the tax coefficient 
of 0.19 reported in column (1) is close to that in Table 3.  
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Column (2) introduces a bank dummy, which takes value one for banks and zero for non-
banks. The bank dummy as well as (1 – bank dummy) is interacted with all control variables, 
so that the estimated coefficients are allowed to differ between banks and non-banks. The 
coefficient of the interaction of the tax variable with the bank dummy in column (2) is 0.07, 
reflecting the average response by banks. The interaction with (1 – bank dummy) is 0.19, 
which reflects the average response for non-banks. Hence, the response for banks is, on 
average, smaller than that for non-banks in this regression.  
 
Column (3) adds a linear interaction of asset size and the tax variable, both for banks and 
non-banks. As before, we find a significant positive interaction for non-banks, i.e. larger 
firms are more responsive to tax than smaller firms. For banks, however, column (3) suggests 
a negative correlation, i.e. larger banks are less responsive to tax than smaller banks. Again, 
this is consistent with our findings in Tables 2 and 3. Column (4) adds an interaction of the 
tax with asset size in quadratic form, both for banks and non-banks. As before, we find that 
the interaction for non-banks is convex, due to the significant positive coefficient for the 
quadratic size term. For banks, the coefficient is insignificant and very small. Column (5) 
only includes a non-linear size effect for non-banks, which is our preferred specification. 
 
Table 4: Capital structure regressions for the full sample of banks and non-banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
CIT rate 0.1873***     
 (8.7099)     
(1-Bank) * CIT   0.1933*** -0.0354 2.9103*** 2.9103*** 
  (8.6134) (-0.3429) (5.7181) (5.7182) 
Bank * CIT   0.0695** 0.8598** 1.6657 0.8598** 
  (2.2107) (2.5466) (0.7317) (2.5466) 
(1-Bank) * Log assets * CIT    0.0121** -0.3050*** -0.3050*** 
   (2.2834) (-5.5936) (-5.5936) 
Bank * Log assets * CIT    -0.0302** -0.0562 -0.0302** 
   (-2.1194) (-0.2886) (-2.1194) 
(1-Bank) * Log assets sq * CIT     0.0084*** 0.0084*** 
    (5.7750) (5.7750) 
Bank * Log ass. sq *CIT    -0.0005  
    (-0.1215)  
Notes: The table shows results from regressions of the leverage-to-assets ratio of banks and non-banks on firm and country 
variables. All regressions are from OLS estimation. T-values based on standard errors robust to clustering at the firm-level 
are in parentheses; ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Regressions control for operating income, 
collateral, GDP growth and inflation. All regressions include time dummies and industry fixed effects. Regressions in 
columns (2), (3), (4), and (5) include interactions between the bank dummy and the full set of capital structure determinants. 
The full regression results are given in Appendix II. 
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Table 5: Testing equivalence of tax effects for non-banks and banks across the bank size 
distribution  
Sam
ple m
eans 
 
Mean non-bank  
log assets:18.58 
~US$ 117.4 million 
Mean bank  
log assets: 21.45 
~US$ 2.1 billion 
Non-banks 0.1469*** 
(6.21) 
Banks 0.2108*** 
(4.67) 
F-Statistic 
Prob > F 
1.57 
(0.21) 
B
ank size Q
10 
Log assets: 18.91 
~ US$ 163.9 million 
(Non-bank size Q57) 
Non-banks 0.1504*** 
(6.38) 
Banks 0.2878*** 
(3.88) 
F-Statistic 
Prob > F 
3.11 
(0.0778) 
B
ank size Q
25 
Log assets: 19.76 
~ US$ 379.9 million 
(Non-bank size Q71.9) 
Non-banks 0.1674*** 
(7.13) 
Banks 0.2624*** 
(4.11) 
F-Statistic 
Prob > F 
1.95 
(0.1626) 
B
ank size Q
50 
Log assets: 21.05 
~ US$ 1.4 billion 
(Non-bank size Q86.9) 
Non-banks 0.2167*** 
(8.65) 
Banks 0.2233*** 
(4.54) 
F-Statistic 
Prob > F 
0.01 
(0.9055) 
Bank size Q
75 
Log assets: 23.04 
~ US$ 10.2 billion 
(Non-bank size Q96.9) 
Non-banks 0.3479*** 
(9.25) 
Banks 0.1630*** 
(4.69) 
F-Statistic 
Prob > F 
13.03 
(0.0003) 
B
ank size Q
90 
Log assets: 24.51 
~ US$ 44.1 billion 
(Non-bank size Q99.3) 
Non-banks 0.4872*** 
(8.58) 
Banks 0.1186*** 
(3.23) 
F-Statistic 
Prob > F 
29.72 
(0.0000) 
B
ank size Q
95 
Log assets: 25.48 
~ US$ 116.3 billion 
(Non-bank size Q99.8) 
 
Non-banks 0.5991*** 
(8.14) 
Banks 0.0892** 
(2.03) 
F-Statistic 
Prob > F 
35.39 
(0.0000) 
Notes: The table shows the joint marginal tax effects on the leverage-to-assets ratio from regression (5) of 
Table 4. Joint effects are computed as linear combinations of the estimated CIT coefficient and the 
coefficients of the interactions between tax and firm size, evaluated at different points of the sample 
distribution of firm size (log of total assets). Standard errors are calculated according to the delta method. 
T-values are given in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
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The regressions with the full sample allow for a series of F-tests to see whether the null of 
equal marginal tax effects between banks and non-banks is rejected or not. Table 5 shows the 
marginal impact evaluated at different points of the size distribution, based on our preferred 
regressions (5) in Table 4. It reports the F-test statistics and the associated p-values, 
reflecting the error probability of rejecting the null of equal marginal tax effects. The first 
row of Table 5 evaluates the joint tax effect at the respective sample means of banks and 
non-banks (i.e. log assets of 18.6 for non-banks, and 21.5 for banks). Here, the tax effect for 
banks is larger than for non-banks: 0.21 and 0.15, respectively. The p-value of the F-test on 
equality is 0.21, and thus cannot reject equality of coefficients between banks and non-banks. 
 
The other rows in Table 5 evaluate the tax effects at six different quantiles of the size 
distribution of banks: Q10, Q25, Q50 (the median), Q75, Q90 and Q95 quantiles. For each 
quantile, we evaluate whether equally sized non-banks differ with respect to tax sensitivity. 
As the bank size distribution in our sample differs from the size distribution of non-banks, 
the left-hand column of Table 5 gives, for each bank-size quantile considered, information on 
the corresponding asset size of non-banks (in logs and levels) and on the relative position in 
the non-bank distribution. For example, Q10 of the bank size distribution has log assets of 
18.9 (US$ 164 million), while non-banks of the same size find themselves at Q57 of the non-
bank size distribution.2 
 
Table 5 cannot reject the null of equivalence between banks and non-banks for quantiles 
Q10, Q25 and Q50. For the latter, the point estimates are in fact very similar: both 0.22 and 
significant. For larger firms, the response of non-banks starts to become larger than for 
banks, as the difference in tax sensitivity between banks and non-banks increases in size. 
Equivalence is rejected for firms as of Q75 of the bank-size distribution. At Q95 of the bank 
size distribution, the tax effect for an equally large non-bank is estimated at 0.6, compared to 
0.09 (and still significant at the 5 percent level) for a bank.  
D.   Quantile regressions 
The OLS regressions estimate the conditional mean response of financial leverage to taxes. 
Tax responses might, however, vary significantly over the leverage distribution. For instance, 
Keen and De Mooij (2012) find that tax responses are much smaller for capital-tight banks 
than for capital-abundant banks. The conditional mean effect estimated by OLS may thus 
reflect a response that comes primarily from the capital-abundant banks. In particular, if 
policy implications are to be drawn from the empirical findings, it seems to make much sense 
to look at the tax effects on the debt policy of those firms, which tend to give debt financing a 
                                                 
2 Note that small banks, e.g. at the 1% quantile of the bank size distribution, show log asset values which are as high as the 25% 
quantile of the size distribution of non-banks. This means that, compared to non-banks, even relatively small banks are at least 
medium-sized firms. It is therefore impossible to draw any conclusion on whether small non-banks are more or less responsive to 
tax than equally sized banks – because there a no comparably sized banks.   
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relatively high weight in their capital structures. To explore this for both banks and non-
banks, this section uses quantile regressions. The aim is to estimate the conditional quantile 
responses, such as the conditional median (Q50) or other quantile responses.3  
 
Tables 6 and 7 show the quantile regression results of the tax impact for both non-banks and 
banks. In Table 6 for non-banks, we use the regression whereby the interaction is with a 
second-order polynomial of size (our preferred model); in Table 7 for banks, we use the 
preferred regression with a linear size interaction. The quantiles of the conditional leverage 
distribution explored here are Q10, Q50, Q75 and Q90. Due to the importance of asset size, 
we evaluate each quantile regression at three quantiles of firm size of the sample for non-
banks and banks, respectively: Q10, Q50 and Q90. Eventually, we obtain a matrix in which 
rows reflect size, and columns reflect quantiles of the conditional distribution of the leverage 
ratio. 
Table 6: Tax effects from quantile regression for non-banks– interaction of tax and second-
order polynomial of size 
Join tax effects 
evaluated at 
Quantiles of the  
conditional distribution of leverage ratio 
F-test of equality 
across quantiles 
of leverage 
Q10 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q10 = Q90 
Non-bank size Q10 
Log assets: 15.77 
~ US$ 7.1 million 
0.0340 
(1.48) 
0.2103*** 
(7.43) 
0.2898*** 
(9.66) 
0.2791*** 
(11.03) 
55.53 
(0.0000) 
Non-bank size Q50 
Log assets: 18.55 
~ US$ 113.7 million 
0.1031*** 
(4.28) 
0.1410*** 
(6.05) 
0.1855*** 
(7.96) 
0.2133*** 
(9.74) 
12.28 
(0.0005) 
Non-bank size Q90 
Log assets: 21.50  
~ US$ 2.2 billion 
0.2452*** 
(9.44) 
0.2448*** 
(10.37) 
0.1957*** 
(8.24) 
0.1449*** 
(6.61) 
9.85 
(0.0017) 
F-test of 
equality across 
quantiles of size 
Q10 
=  
Q90 
175.71 
(0.0000) 
2.75 
(0.0975) 
14.65 
(0.0001) 
40.64 
(0.0000)  
Notes: The marginal tax effects shown in this table are from quantile regressions for non-banks estimating the response 
of the conditional Q10, Q50, Q75, Q90 leverage-to-assets ratio to company and country level determinants, using 
interactions between the CIT rate and a second order polynomial of size. In addition, regressions control for operating 
income, collateral, GDP growth and inflation. All regressions include time dummies, country dummies and industry 
fixed effects. T-values based on bootstrapped cluster robust standard errors (100 replications) are in parenthesis. Results 
for F-tests of equality of tax effects across the 10% and 90% quantiles of, respectively, size or conditional leverage-to-
assets show test statistics and associated p-values. The full regression results are given in Appendix III. 
 
                                                 
3 OLS estimates the conditional expectation by minimizing the sum of squared residuals. Quantile regression minimizes the sum of 
(asymmetrically weighted) absolute residuals (Koencker and Bassett, 1978; Koencker and Hallock, 2001). 
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The quantile regressions reflect a response of the conditional leverage distribution. That is, 
given all characteristics of a firm that affect its leverage, there remains a distribution of firms 
along which we can evaluate the tax response. The quantiles refer to this conditional 
distribution, not an unconditional one.  
 
In Table 6 for non-banks, we observe a fall and rise of values when we go down along the 
columns. For quantiles Q50, Q75 of the conditional leverage distribution (columns (3) and 
(4)), there is a convex relationship between asset size and the tax coefficient of non-banks, 
i.e. tax effects are smallest for Q50 of the size distribution. For Q10 of the conditional 
leverage distribution (column (2)), however, the relationship monotonically increases in asset 
size; for Q90 (column (5)), it monotonically decreases. Hence, the convex relationship 
observed in Figure 3 does not hold universally along the conditional leverage distribution. 
The F-test at the bottom of Table 6 rejects equivalence of tax effects between size Q10 and 
Q90 for all conditional quantiles, with significance at the 10 percent level. At 5 percent 
confidence, however, equivalence is not rejected for Q50 of the conditional leverage 
distribution. 
Table 7: Tax effects from quantile regression for banks – interaction of tax and first-order 
polynomial of size 
Join tax effects  
evaluated at 
Quantiles of the  
conditional distribution of leverage ratio 
F-test of equality 
across quantiles 
of leverage  
Q10 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q10 = Q90 
Bank size Q10 
Log assets: 18.91 
~ US$ 163.9 million 
 (Non-bank size Q57) 
0.3119*** 
(5.85) 
0.1434*** 
(9.65) 
0.1207*** 
(7.97) 
0.0999*** 
(7.54) 
15.65 
(0.0001) 
Bank size Q50 
Log assets: 21.05 
~ US$ 1.4 billion 
 (Non-bank size Q86.9) 
0.2416*** 
(5.69) 
0.1124*** 
(9.85) 
0.0960*** 
(8.42) 
0.0731*** 
(6.90) 
15.41 
(0.0001) 
Bank size Q90 
Log assets: 24.51  
~ US$ 44.1 billion 
 (Non-bank size Q99.3) 
0.1274*** 
(4.26) 
0.062*** 
(6.64) 
0.0559*** 
(6.66) 
0.0297*** 
(2.81) 
9.73 
(0.0018) 
F-test of 
equality across 
quantiles of size 
Q10 
=  
Q90 
26.68 
(0.0000) 
39.34 
(0.0000) 
25.69 
(0.0000) 
29.77 
(0.0000)  
The marginal tax effects shown in this table are from quantile regressions for banks estimating the response of the 
conditional Q10, Q50, Q75, Q90 leverage-to-assets ratio to bank and country level determinants, using interactions 
between the CIT rate and a first order polynomial of size. In addition, regressions control for operating income, collateral, 
GDP growth and inflation. All regressions include time dummies and country dummies. T-values based on bootstrapped 
cluster robust standard errors (100 replications) are in parenthesis. Results for F-tests of equality of tax effects across the 
10% and 90% quantiles of, respectively, size or conditional leverage-to-assets show test statistics and associated p-values. 
The full regression results are given in Appendix III. 
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Next, look along the rows of Table 6. For a non-bank of median size, i.e. Q50, the tax 
response rises along the conditional leverage distribution, i.e. the conditionally more 
leveraged firms are more responsive to tax. This also holds for some range of the smaller 
firms at size Q10, although the firms with the highest conditional leverage ratio (Q90) are 
slightly less responsive than at Q75. For the large firms, however, the pattern is opposite: 
here, higher conditional leverage ratios reduce the firm’s responsiveness to tax. The F-tests in 
the final column of Table 6 also rejects that the tax effects of Q10 and Q90 of the conditional 
leverage distribution are equivalent, which holds for all size groups.  
 
Overall, these results in Table 6 suggest that the biggest tax responses are found for (i) large 
firms, but with a relatively low conditional leverage ratio; (ii) small firms, but with a 
relatively high conditional leverage ratio. The smallest tax responses are found for (i) small 
firms with a relatively low conditional leverage ratio; (ii) large firms with very high 
conditional leverage. 
 
In Table 7, we see that the tax response for banks falls with asset size for all conditional 
leverage quantiles. This is due to the restriction that size is only interacted linearly with the 
tax rate (although we find the same outcome if we include a second-order polynomial for this 
interaction). Hence, the larger the bank, the smaller is the tax response. The F-test at the 
bottom of Table 7 rejects equivalence of the responses between size groups for all 
conditional quantiles of the leverage distribution.  
Considering the rows of Table 7, we see a consistent pattern that the tax response declines 
with the conditional leverage ratio. Hence, banks are always less responsive to tax when they 
have high conditional leverage to start with, irrespective of whether they are small or large. 
The F-test in the final column suggests further that the difference between Q10 and Q90 of 
the conditional leverage distribution is always significant. For the largest banks with the 
highest conditional leverage ratio at Q90, we still find that the tax response is positive and 
significant: the marginal impact is 0.03 for these banks. 
 
IV.   CONCLUSIONS  
This paper finds that tax bias toward debt finance induced by corporate tax systems matters 
for both banks and non-banks. Our preferred specification suggests that an average bank is 
equally responsive to tax incentives as an average non-bank.  
 
Tax responses vary in different ways between banks and non-banks across the size 
distribution. For non-banks, OLS regressions find a U-shaped pattern between asset size and 
the responsiveness to tax. For banks, in contrast, we find a linearly declining relationship of 
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the tax response with asset size. Hence, while large firms are relatively responsive to tax, 
large banks are not. 
 
Quantile regressions show further that capital-tight banks on the conditional leverage 
distribution are significantly less responsive than are capital-abundant banks. The result holds 
for banks of all sizes. Still, even the largest banks with high conditional leverage ratios 
feature a significant, positive tax response. For non-banks, patterns of tax responsiveness 
vary on the conditional leverage distribution, with the largest response found for small firms 
with high conditional leverage and large firms with low conditional leverage. Unlike small 
firms and banks, for large firms and banks the pattern of tax responsiveness along conditional 
leverage distribution is similar. 
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Appendix I: Data by country 
 
Table A-1 depicts the geographical distribution of all firms and associated firm-year 
observations in our sample. Moreover, the table indicates, for each country, the number of 
years with observations. For 42 of the 70 countries covered, there is data for all years from 
1996 to 2010. In 28 countries, the number of years of data falls below the full sample period. 
With respect to the geographical distribution, the United States makes up more than 20 
percent of all observations. Taken together the US, Japan, China, Canada, Taiwan and India 
account for more than 52 percent. Adding firm-years observed for Korea, Australia, UK, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Germany and France covers more than 76 percent of the observations.  
Table A-1: Sample composition by countries 
 Number of   Number of 
             
Country Years All firms Banks 
Firm-
years 
Bank-
years  Country years 
All 
firms Banks  
Firm-
years 
Bank-
years 
             
Argentina 15 92 8 998 91  Lithuania 8 31 2 142 12 
Australia 15 1,700 7 12,464 104  Luxembourg 15 35 1 305 15 
Austria 15 88 7 1,012 99  Macedonia 5 30 4 139 19 
Bahrain 2 44 14 87 28  Malaysia 15 928 10 9,195 147 
Barbados 6 2  9   Malta 6 18 4 104 24 
Belgium 15 142 4 1,588 43  Mauritius 6 36 2 197 11 
Bermuda 2 1  2   Netherlands 15 124 1 1,562 12 
Brazil 15 191 5 1,497 55  New Zealand 15 135  1,136  
Bulgaria 7 255 4 1,363 24  Norway 15 218 23 2,027 289 
Canada 15 2795 11 17,478 143  Pakistan 8 279 21 1,677 142 
Cayman 8 8  46   Peru 15 146 12 1,260 108 
Chile 15 201 7 2,273 92  Philippines 15 230 13 2,389 183 
China 14 2,241 17 17,700 136  Poland 15 440 16 2,943 186 
Colombia 15 62 8 502 83  Portugal 15 56 4 668 60 
Croatia 6 105 10 604 60  Romania 6 151 3 862 18 
Cyprus 8 124 4 704 24  Russia  11 543 18 3,138 112 
Czech Rep. 15 16 1 166 15  Saudi Arabia 8 148 11 707 66 
Denmark 15 203 32 2,164 423  Serbia 3 101 12 300 36 
Estonia 8 15  80   Singapore 15 724 3 6,493 45 
Finland 15 121 3 1,573 41  Slovakia 15 25 4 172 34 
France 15 788 21 8,602 274  Slovenia 10 53 2 307 12 
Germany 15 997 11 9,791 141  South Africa 15 330 7 3,341 81 
Greece 15 262 11 3,006 141  Spain 15 152 11 1,741 120 
Hong Kong 15 1,254 8 11,839 110  Sri Lanka 15 219 14 1,381 122 
Hungary 15 45 1 397 15  Sweden 15 455 4 4,026 60 
Iceland 9 6  42   Switzerland 15 268 26 3,142 356 
India 15 2,399 40 14,929 386  Taiwan 15 1,689 20 15,371 230 
Indonesia 13 420 29 3,695 268  Thailand 15 517 11 5,440 150 
Ireland 15 49 2 584 30  Turkey 7 335 17 2,079 119 
Israel 15 471 10 3,097 113  UK 15 1,530 9 13,684 92 
Italy 15 269 19 2,999 276  Ukraine 8 80 8 404 47 
Japan 15 3,587 93 43,405 1,222  USA 15 8,369 878 67,209 9,579 
Kazakhstan 6 35 12 198 66  Venezuela 7 38 10 213 52 
Korea 15 1,695 15 14,237 150  Vietnam 8 720 8 3,014 35 
Latvia 5 31  152         
             
       Total 15 39,867 1,603 336,051 17,227 
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Appendix II: Regressions on the full sample of non-banks and banks 
 
Table A-2: Capital structure regressions for the full sample of banks and non-banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CIT rate 0.1873***     
 (8.7099)     
(1-Bank) * CIT  0.1933*** -0.0354 2.9103*** 2.9103*** 
  (8.6134) (-0.3429) (5.7181) (5.7182) 
Bank * CIT  0.0695** 0.8598** 1.6657 0.8598** 
  (2.2107) (2.5466) (0.7317) (2.5466) 
Log assets 0.0197***     
 (5.4182)     
(1-Bank) *Log assets  -0.0061 0.0259*** 0.1036*** 0.1036*** 
  (-1.4739) (13.7915) (5.1679) (5.1679) 
Bank * Log assets  0.1447*** 0.0255*** 0.1840** 0.0255*** 
  (8.8900) (4.4553) (2.4253) (4.4553) 
Log assets sq. 0.0002**     
 (2.4538)     
(1-Bank) *Log assets sq.  0.0010***  -0.0021*** -0.0021*** 
  (8.6538)  (-3.8451) (-3.8451) 
Bank * Log assets sq.  -0.0030***  -0.0032**  
  (-8.2326)  (-1.9931)  
Log assets * CIT      
      
(1-Bank) * Log assets * CIT   0.0121** -0.3050*** -0.3050*** 
   (2.2834) (-5.5936) (-5.5936) 
Bank * Log assets * CIT   -0.0302** -0.0562 -0.0302** 
   (-2.1194) (-0.2886) (-2.1194) 
Log assets sq * CIT      
      
(1-Bank) * Log assets sq * 
CIT    0.0084*** 0.0084*** 
    (5.7750) (5.7750) 
Bank * Log ass. sq *CIT    -0.0005  
    (-0.1215)  
Operating Income -0.1012***     
 (-30.5968)     
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Table A-2 (continued) 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1-Bank) * Operating 
Income  -0.1009*** -0.1111*** -0.1010*** -0.1010*** 
  (-30.5312) (-34.0437) (-30.5043) (-30.5044) 
Bank * Operating Income  -0.0729 0.0484 -0.0794 0.0484 
  (-0.6979) (0.4225) (-0.7640) (0.4225) 
Collateral 0.0651***     
 (14.8541)     
(1-Bank) * Collateral  0.0645*** 0.0628*** 0.0643*** 0.0643*** 
  (14.6757) (14.3532) (14.6397) (14.6397) 
Bank * Collateral  -0.2952** -0.3945*** -0.2533* -0.3945*** 
  (-2.0447) (-2.6881) (-1.8001) (-2.6881) 
GDP growth 0.0303**     
 (2.4907)     
(1-Bank) * GDP growth  0.0312** 0.0324** 0.0307** 0.0307** 
  (2.4621) (2.5543) (2.4230) (2.4230) 
Bank * GDP growth  0.0447* -0.0004 0.0253 -0.0004 
  (1.7624) (-0.0152) (1.0005) (-0.0152) 
Inflation -0.0766***     
 (-3.6833)     
(1-Bank) * Inflation  -0.0836*** -0.0813*** -0.0828*** -0.0828*** 
  (-3.8402) (-3.7406) (-3.8081) (-3.8081) 
Bank * Inflation  -0.0556 -0.0590 -0.0733* -0.0590 
  (-1.4012) (-1.3898) (-1.8391) (-1.3898) 
Constant -0.0393     
 (-1.1008)     
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 336,051 336,051 336,051 336,051 336,051 
Adj. R-squared 0.341 0.345 0.344 0.345 0.345 
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Appendix III: Quantile regressions 
 
 
Table A-3: Quantile regression for non-banks – interaction of tax and second-order 
polynomial of size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Q10 Q50 Q75 Q90 
CIT rate 0.8622*** 3.766*** 3.045*** 0.6832* 
 (4.42) (10.70) (7.18) (1.77) 
Log assets -0.0117 0.1650*** 0.1309*** 0.0074 
 (-1.52) (13.28) (8.92) (0.50) 
Log assets sq. 0.0009*** -0.0036*** -0.0027*** 0.0004 
 (4.13) (-11.26) (-7.28) (0.99) 
Log assets * CIT -0.1185*** -0.3952*** -0.2905*** -0.0269 
 (-5.58) (-11.15) (-6.89) (-0.69) 
Log assets sq * CIT 0.0042*** 0.0108*** 0.0073*** 0.0001 
 (7.35) (12.04) (7.04) (0.09) 
Operating income -0.0389*** -0.1089*** -0.1726*** -0.1863*** 
 (-20.33) (-37.82) (-43.47) (-45.45) 
Collateral 0.0909*** 0.0623*** 0.0148*** -0.0098*** 
 (42.92) (23.35) (5.22) (-3.69) 
GDP growth 0.0203 0.0762*** 0.0292 0.0039 
 (1.19) (4.12) (1.35) (0.17) 
Inflation -0.1862*** -0.0727** 0.0196 0.0209 
 (-6.60) (-2.46) (0.63) (0.63) 
Constant 0.0809 -1.4482*** -0.9817*** 0.3996*** 
 (1.13) (-11.64) (-6.62) (2.67) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 318,824 318,824 318,824 318,824 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.1759 0.1577 0.1170 0.0914 
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Table A-4: Quantile regression for banks – interaction of tax and first-order polynomial of size 
 (1) (3) (4) (5) 
 Q10 Q50 Q75 Q90 
CIT rate 0.9358*** 0.4185*** 0.3397*** 0.3371*** 
 (5.56) (7.74) (6.02) (6.32) 
Log assets 0.0237*** 0.0094*** 0.0073*** 0.0070*** 
 (9.09) (10.25) (8.12) (7.86) 
Log assets * CIT -0.0330*** -0.0145*** -0.0116 -0.0125*** 
 (-5.17) (-6.27) (-5.07) (-5.46) 
Operating income 0.0458 -0.5557*** -0.6892*** -0.7418*** 
 (0.31) (-7.58) (-13.51) (-15.42) 
Collateral -0.4728*** -0.1837*** -0.1483*** -0.1476*** 
 (-3.31) (-5.12) (-4.89) (-7.22) 
GDP growth 0.0623* 0.0469*** 0.0267*** 0.0249** 
 (1.81) (3.96) (3.09) (2.44) 
Inflation -0.1480** -0.1041*** -0.0401** -0.0279* 
 (-2.45) (-6.09) (-2.27) (-1.71) 
Constant 0.1830** 0.6764*** 0.7397*** 0.7683*** 
 (2.22) (30.09) (33.19) (36.44) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 17,227 17,227 17,227 17,227 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.2030 0.2080 0.2559 0.2761 
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